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A Business Roundtable

How
Social Security
Can Survivey

T

he nation's Social Security system is in a dilemma. Its retirement fund
is paying out more in benefits than it is collecting in taxes, and that has
a lot of people worried—not just the one in six Americans who
currently receives some form of Social Security benefit (retirement, survivor, or
disability) but also the nine out of ten workers in the nation's labor force who
are being taxed by the system and who are counting on receiving Social
Security benefits when they retire. They're concerned that their benefits will
be drastically cut, or that the system will go bankrupt and they will lose their
benefits completely.
Since 1975, the annual benefits paid by the Social Security pension fund
have exceeded the annual Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes collected
and earmarked for that fund. The program managed to pay its bills through
early November with its reserves, which now are exhausted. Congress has
staved off bankruptcy through June by permitting the retirement fund to
borrow from Social Security's separate Medicare and disability insurance
programs. But if that borrowing stops, or if the problems causing this shortfall
are not corrected by July of this year, certain government officials predict that
the system will indeed be bankrupt.
The administration and some congressional members wanted the Congress
to address Social Security's deficits in the '81 and '82 sessions; but due to its
political sensitivity, the issue was assigned instead to the 15-member bipartisan
National Commission on Social Security Reform, established by President
Reagan in 1981. In January of this year, the commission reached agreement on
a $169 billion proposal that Congress will consider in the coming weeks.
Meanwhile, we thought it an appropriate time for the nation's commercial
sector to express its opinion on this timely and important topic, and to
examine the issue from a business perspective. With that in mind, we invited
a group of knowledgeable and influential business leaders from varied
backgrounds to an informal and open discussion of the Social Security issue.
What follows is an abbreviated version of that discussion.
RUSSELL E. PALMER
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Russell Palmer: What are the problems
with Social Security today? Is the system
about to go bankrupt? Does it need
drastic changes?

MODERATOR
Russell E. Palmer
Managing Director
Touche Ross International
PARTICIPANTS
Robert H.B.Baldwin
President
Morgan Stanley & Co.
Robert A. Beck, CLU
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Prudential Insurance Co. of America
JohnH.Flittie,FSA
National Director—Actuarial
Consulting
Touche Ross & Co.

and Benefits

John A. Koskinen
President and Chief Executive Officer
Victor Palmieri & Co., Incorporated
Robert J. Myers, FSA
Executive Director
National Commission on Social Security
Reform
Judge Simon H. Rifkind
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison

Robert Beck: Taking the short-term
problems first and the long-term problems second, one observation that we
can make about Social Security is that the
nation just cannot afford full indexation
for benefit increases. In the three years
ending with 1981, for example, wages
went up 30 percent, while the cost of
living went up 40 percent. Because we
indexed Social Security benefits at 40
percent, the benefits paid out increased
10 percent more than the wages taxed to
finance them. That difference cost the
system $11 billion a year. And that's $11
billion forever. Each year's increase
becomes part of the base on which
the next year's increase is calculated.
To avoid this disproportion in the
future, several very worthwhile recommendations have been made. The
Business Roundtable has suggested that
benefit increases be indexed to either
wages or prices, whichever is lower.
Milton Friedman has recommended that
we ignore the first two or three percentage points of change in the cost of living.
Some countries have put caps on cost of
living increases, never letting them rise
above 4 or 5 percent. And some people
think we should change the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), because it's overly
sensitive to factors that affect retirees less
than other people.
I think retirees generally would accept
a lowering of benefit increases if it were
properly presented, free of political
rhetoric. If the president and other
responsible people from both sides of
the aisle all came together, we could,
before too long, have a reasonable
solution to the indexing problem.
Robert Myers: I think people don't
understand just how sensitive the Social
Security system is to indexing. For
example: if, in the 1977 act, we had been
required to apply the lesser of a wage or
a price index, we wouldn't have this
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problem today. Or take the proposal
made by Senator Hollings, which is to
forgo any CPI increase this year and then
to reduce future CPI increases by 2.5
percent each year until the trust fund has
built up. If that were done, all the
short-range problems in the system
would almost certainly be solved. Not
being aware of this possibility, people
think the system is facing complete
bankruptcy and that nothing can help it.
John Koskinen: Sometimes politicians
underestimate the voters' common sense
and decency. In talking to people in a
retirement community that we run in
Florida, I hear beneficiaries saying that
while they're delighted with the Social
Security increases, they know that they
never really paid for them. They understand that the benefits they've received
have been inequitable because the
wages of people out in the work force
haven't gone up as fast. That's why I, too,
think retirees would go along with a
reduction in the rate of benefit increases,
if it assured the system's future. They're
not worried about the system's collapse
due to bankruptcy. That's not a meaningful threat. If the system ultimately
collapses, it will be because the body
politic refuses to support it any longer.
John Flittie: Another dimension is that we
are not going to be able to achieve any
significant changes in Social Security
until there is more recognition of the
problem by the leadership of organized
labor. The AFL-CIO and UAW, as well as
many other large unions, have steadfastly
been in favor of continuation or even
expansion of Social Security. Yet at the
same time, they have been asked for
give-ups in their negotiated benefit programs with major U.S. corporations. The
union leaders are going to be in a very
difficult situation with their membership
if they endorse any type of slowdown, let
alone reduction, in Social Security.
Robert Beck: just by changing the date
alone for adjusting benefits by the
CPI—by moving it back three months to
put it on the same fiscal year as the
government—we probably could save
$12-15 billion in five years. There are a lot
of little things that could be done. To me,

though, the most important one is to
change the system of indexing, and then
apply it to all other entitlement programs. When former Speaker of the
House John McCormack died, his
pension benefit was not only more than
he ever got as a congressman, it was
more than the current Speaker of the
House gets. The way the system works
now, federal employees can plan on
retiring and know when their pension
benefit will exceed their current earnings.
The military is the same way. A former
Chief of Naval Operations is making
considerably more than the current CNO.
If we had that kind of indexing in our
corporate pension funds, we'd all go
broke.
Russell Palmer: At Touche Ross, we
decided to stop indexing our retirement
program by the CPI. The corporate world
has had to adjust to these things, but
Social Security hasn't. Why is that?
Robert Baldwin: Congressman Jim Jones
[D-Okla.] has worked on this. He has
said that for the first time they had
convinced the veterans' groups to agree
to some reduction in the index for
veterans. They've been working with the
retired people, too, and they think they
might move them. The toughest ones are
going to be the civil servants, but Jim
Jones is quite optimistic.
Robert Myers: The government needs to
get across to people that this would not
be the first time that Social Security
benefits have been reduced. There have
been many instances in the past, going
back to 1939.
Judge Simon Rifkind: How were they
cut? By legislation?
Robert Myers: Yes. In fact, some people
would be better off now if the 1935 law
had continued, instead of being
amended in 1939. The 1935 law, quote,
guaranteed that everybody would always
get back at least as much in benefits as

they had paid in taxes. But that feature
was knocked out in 1939. As a result, you
have people today who pay Social
Security all their lives, who die before
they retire, who don't leave any survivors,
and to whom nothing is paid. This is one
of the deliberalizing features that was
added in the past. It was a trade. Monthly
survivor benefits were provided instead
of a guaranteed refund.
Russell Palmer: Originally, Social Security
wasn't set up on a pay-as-you-go basis,
was it?
Robert Myers: No. The original intent
was to build up a fairly sizable fund that
would generate interest to meet a
portion of the program's cost. But over
the years this arrangement gave way to
political pressures to increase benefits
and keep taxes down. During the 1960s
particularly, people worried about the fiscal drag that would be caused by a big
budget surplus.
Judge Rifkind: Social Security never was
meant to provide anybody with all they
need to live on. The assumption was that
when people retired they would have
some assets, and Social Security would
give them some supplementary cash.
Only of late have I heard people speak of
Social Security as something they are
relying on for a livelihood—which, it
seems to me, is like using an umbrella in
a tornado.
Robert Myers: I've always viewed Social
Security not as a supplement to what
people already have, but the other way
around—as a floor of protection that
people would build on.
Judge Rifkind: You can treat it either way.
Also, what if we eliminated the welfare
features from the system? By welfare, I
mean aid to children whose parents did
not work for Social Security, or did so
very little. What if we confined Social
Security to what it originally was conceived for, as something you would get
because you—and your employer—paid
for it during your working years? Some
fellow might get more, of course,
because he lived longer; some fellow
might get less because he lived for a
shorter time. That's part of the insurance
game.

All entitlement programs tend to grow.
Maybe that is because you have to draw
sharp dividing lines, and it always seems
a little harsh not to benefit the fellow
just outside the line. But suppose we
stripped away these welfare features
from Social Security and treated them
separately. Providing aid to children is a
perfectly good thing to do. Maybe the
most important thing to do. But it has
nothing to do with Social Security. Treat
welfare as welfare, and treat Social
Security as Social Security. Would the
system then become perfectly solvent,
durable, and performable over the years?
Russell Palmer: Let's look at the alternatives to changing the rate of increase in
benefits. What other factors will affect the
fund's balance?
John Koskinen: You could move the
retirement age back and begin payments
later in the beneficiary's life. I think it
would be very difficult to tell the people
who are within ten years of retirement
that we've changed the rules of the
game. Even if you move the retirement
age back only by a month or two a year
from now until 1995, or some time, many
people will feel that their contract has
been changed without their consent.
Judge Rifkind: How about people who
are just entering the work force? They'd
have no squawk.
John Koskinen: Maybe not, but that still
leaves millions of people who have been
counting on the system for years.
Politically, you wouldn't have much
chance of moving the retirement age
back for them, and so the short-term
problems would remain.
Robert Myers: Some people believe that
there is no problem that can't be solved
very easily within the system itself. They
recognize that the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund will not be able to
pay benefits in a timely manner beginning July 1983, but they say that all we
need to do is allow borrowing among the
three trust funds that are supported by
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"Ofthe long-term problems,
however, the most important
need is to extend the
retirement age. It could be
done gradually, excluding
everyone who is ten years or
less away from retirement.
The change for people who
are now between about 45
and 55 would be very quiet
and slow. That way you'd
have a whole wave of people
who either wouldn't be
affected at all, or would be
affected very little. As long
as you make decisions that
far in advance, you can
move it politically."

payroll taxes and also from the General
Fund of the Treasury. The loans would be
repayable with interest, and could be
repaid, they say, during the 1990s, when
the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Trust Fund will have relatively lower
costs. As for the long-range problems
that have been foreseen, these people
say the cost estimates are far too pessimistic and that the costs won't be nearly
as high as the intermediate estimates
would suggest.
Judge Rifkind: Why will the cost go
down in the 1990s?
Robert Myers: Because then the people
reaching age 62 will belong to the
generation born in the 1930s, which was
relatively small compared to that of the
1920s or to the years right after World
War II—the baby-boom generation. So
although the costs won't drop sharply in
the 1990s, they will level off or even
decrease slightly in relative terms—that is,
as measured against the taxable payroll.
Judge Rifkind: Does that take into
account the indexing of benefits to the
Consumer Price Index?
Robert Myers: Yes, but under the optimistic assumption that very soon wages
will, once again, rise more rapidly than
prices—by 1.5 or 2 percent a year. If that
does occur, the estimates show that there
will be far more income than outgo in
the 1990s. In part, this will occur because
the OASDI tax rate is scheduled to rise
significantly in 1990. Of course, if wages
don't rise more rapidly than prices, this
won't happen.
Robert Beck: As for the short-term
problems, certainly the most dramatic
effect would come from changing the
indexing. Of the long-term problems,
however, the most important need is to
extend the retirement age. It could be
done gradually, excluding everyone who
is ten years or less away from retirement.
The change for people who are now
between about 45 and 55 would be very
quiet and slow. That way you'd have a
whole wave of people who either
wouldn't be affected at all, or would be
affected very little. As long as you make

decisions that far in advance, you can
move it politically.
Robert Myers: Today, around 60 percent
of all Social Security beneficiariesexcluding those who claim disability
benefits—claim retirement benefits
before they reach age 65. The theory is
that you don't pay benefits to people
who aren't retired.
John Flittie: So maybe we should consider making early retirement less
attractive.
Robert Beck: In 1937, when 65 was
selected as the normal retirement age, it
was about right for people then, considering their longevity. At the present time,
the equivalent age is closer to 69. By the
year 2000, we think it's going to be about
72 or 74. Based on calculations that we've
run at Prudential, the difference between
a statutory retirement age of 65 and one
of 68, at today's longevity, is costing the
system $30 billion a year—some 15
percent of the total cost of the system.
But remember what happened a year
and a half ago, when the administration
proposed to reduce the early retirement
benefits at age 62 from 80 percent to 55
percent? The proposal got blown out of
the water. It wasn't politically doable. It
just divided the political parties in a way
that ruined any chance to get something
done.
Russell Palmer: Maybe it would be easier
to gain acceptance for changing the
retirement age if people could work
part-time without losing their benefits.
For example: occasionally we would like
to hire some of our retired partners back
for short-term projects, but they say that
while they might come back for free,
they can't afford to have us pay them.
Bob, can you explain that to me?
Robert Myers: A lot of them don't even
retire. They can get some benefits and
still go on working. In a certain small area
of earnings, people can't afford to come
back to work because they'll make less
after taxes than they would if they stayed

home. We could do away with the
earnings test and pay everybody at
65—and there is now an annual exemption in the earnings test—but then we'd
be paying a lot of people who are still
working and never thought of retiringpeople like well-paid lawyers and
doctors. There's just no perfect solution.

Robert Myers: It will require some
cooperation from employers, though.
They should try to keep people on until
the new retirement age, because if they
don't, and if the people who retire early
have no private pension plan, the
reduction in their benefits could be
painful.

raise the revenues. There are some
scheduled raises coming along, but if
you're still paying out more money than
you're taking in, and if you think it would
be very difficult politically to get a
reduction in costs over the near term,
maybe you'll have to increase the Social
Security taxes.

Russell Palmer: No one says they can't
earn $100,000 a year in interest or dividends. Why are they penalized if they go
out and do something productive?

John Koskinen: Then we also need to
know the demographics in order to
calculate the effect of having more people in the work force. We have a high
unemployment rate now, and it would
be higher still if many people continued
working for three more years after
they're 65.

Robert Myers: If you raised them by
about .5 percent of payroll for both the
employer and the employee, the shortterm problems would almost certainly be
solved, but you'd still have the long-term
problems.

Robert Myers: If you take interest, dividends, and private pensions into account
in the retirement test, you destroy the
value of savings for a lot of people.
They'll say, "Why save any money if it's
only going to take away from Social
Security?" One solution might be to raise
the exempt amount of earnings a lot
higher than it is now, although not so
high that a doctor making $100,000 a year
would get Social Security benefits.
Russell Palmer: How many people over
65 who are eligible for benefits lose them
because they work?
Robert Myers: About 1.5 million.
Robert Baldwin: They keep on working
and just defer the benefits, right?
Robert Myers: Yes, and beginning in 1983
the benefits will be 3 percent higher for
each year that benefits were withheld.
Robert Baldwin: What are the maximum
benefits?
Robert Beck: As of December 1981, a
person who retires at age 65 with a
spouse age 65 can receive the maximum
benefit of $14,206.
Robert Baldwin: So, somebody who
wants to go out and earn $50,000 can
probably defer this and come out ahead.
But it's a fairly highly paid person.
Robert Myers: Where the shoe pinches is
on earnings between $6,000 and about
$20,000 a year. In that range, people will
often be worse off by working than not
working.
Russell Palmer: / think we have very
persuasive arguments for raising the retirement age to reflect the increase in
longevity.

Robert Beck: The demographics show
that by the time we hope to put the new
retirement age of 68 fully into effect,
we'll need to have people working
longer. Actually, total employment has
been increasing very dramatically over
the last several years. Much of the
unemployment we're seeing results from
women going into the labor force. But by
1995, we're going to be needing people
in the work force until they're 68.
John Koskinen: But then comes another
bulge, and by the years 2010 or 2020,
somewhere in there, we'll be in the same
situation that we're in now—more people
than the work force can absorb.
Robert Myers: Of course, it depends on
what happens with birth rates.
Robert Beck: Based on the current birth
rate, the problem will be in not having
enough people in the work force. If
there's an increase in the birth rate, eventually there will be two persons paying in
for every beneficiary. If the birth rate
doesn't increase, we'll have only oneand-a-half persons working for every
person receiving benefits.
Russell Palmer: One thing I haven't
heard anyone say is that we've got to

Robert Baldwin: From 1969 to 1972, the
government went crazy coming up with
benefits. They said it won't cost us
anything, and look at what we can do for
our constituents. Well, that's the thing
that we've got to stop in this country. I
think raising Social Security taxes would
be very shortsighted. We'd end up with a
lot of the problems that Norway and
Sweden are facing.
Judge Rifkind: It also would generate
pressure for an increase in salaries and
wages. People know what their takehome pay is.
Robert Beck: From 1949 to 1981, average
wages in this country increased 470
percent. Maximum Social Security taxes
went up 6,480 percent through 1981; and
if you add in 1982, they will have
increased more than 7,000 percent. For
workers taxed to the maximum wage
base, their contribution and the
employers' contribution add up to $4,300
a year. Most economists, and I think
properly, consider the total, and not just
the employer's contribution, as being the
real cost when the employer is deciding
whether to put another person on the
payroll. If you go to the year 1990, the
total tax figured on the estimated
maximum wage base, including the
already scheduled increases, will be
$9,000 a year.
Robert Baldwin: That's in constant
dollars?
Robert Beck: No, nominal dollars. By
1990, the employee alone will pay $4,600
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"Right now, we have the
opportunity to put the
system on a sound footing
with relatively modest
changes in any of these areas.
The great danger is that the
country will listen to those
people who say there really
isn't a problem and that we
don't need to worry until
the end of the century. If we
do nothing now, the benefits
will go on compounding for
17 more years; and, come
the year 2000, we won't
have the luxury of
wondering whether to move
retirement back a little or
cut benefit increases
slightly."

a year—just with the increases that are
already scheduled. You know, a large
number of American taxpayers are
currently paying more in Social Security
taxes than income taxes. So I think there's
some reasonable limit on how far you
can go with taxes. Our studies suggest
that the increases already scheduled
ought to be the maximum planned on
for now, that we should concentrate on
the other measures that we have been
discussing.
Russell Palmer: Another alternative is to
get more people into the program. Then
we'd have more money coming in,
currently at least. That would help with
some of the short-term problems. Why
haven't we tried this? Instead, we have
many nonprofit organizations that are
pulling out.
Robert Beck: There are some constitutional questions about this, at least for
state employees, but we've recommended that Social Security be mandatory and that nobody have the option to
pull out. We're taking an enormous
amount of static on it. We at Prudential
are the biggest insurers of municipal
programs in the country, and every time I
make a speech on mandatory Social
Security, I get a flood of protest letters
from people who are in one of our
insured plans. Yet, we think it must be
done. Initially, we may have to exempt
the state employees, but we should stop
giving nonprofit organizations the option
to move in or out. We also ought to
include federal employees, starting
immediately with all new workers.
Robert Myers: The vast majority of them
will get Social Security benefits anyway.
It's estimated quite reliably that 80
percent of all federal employees who get
Civil Service Retirement benefits will also
be eligible for Social Security benefits
when they reach age 62.

Judge Rifkind: Because of work earlier in
their careers?
Robert Myers: Or later. Or simultaneously. And the benefits will be relatively
large in proportion to what they've paid
in because they didn't contribute all their
lives. Naturally they want to keep that
windfall.
John Flittie: Over the last year, I've
consulted with several hospitals that are
thinking of opting out. A survey we did a
while ago showed that a third of the
nonprofit hospitals in this country had
either filed their notice to withdraw or
were seriously considering it. I suspect
that if we took that survey today, we'd
find probably 50 or 60 percent of them
seriously considering it. Many hospitals
put the issue to their employees in a
referendum. Management asks it this
way: "Would you rather have a tax
sheltered annuity in the Prudential or a
nonsecured promise to pay by your
children and grandchildren?" Couched in
those terms, of course, the answer is easy.
John Koskinen: Right now, 90 percent of
the workers in the country are covered.
The proposal, then, is to cover the other
10 percent and thereby increase the
number of people paying in. But haven't
we simply rolled the problem forward?
Robert Myers: No. It's a great short-term
gain, obviously, but it's a gain in the long
term, too. Because even though these 10
percent of the workers aren't covered
currently, they will get Social Security
benefits anyway, through their spouses or
through their own work. So you're not
increasing the liabilities nearly as much as
you're increasing the income.
John Koskinen: The other side of the
issue is the negative side. Even if you
wouldn't gain a lot by adding the last 10
percent, you'd certainly lose by letting
the 90 percent erode.
Robert Beck: If the number covered
went to 80 percent, you'd have 20
percent of the people paying nothing
and eventually finding some way to get
benefits.
John Flittie: Let's discuss for a moment
the concept of the three-legged stool.
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Social Security, private savings, and the
private pension plan together provide for
people's needs in old age. If the other
two legs could be strengthened, politicians might not need to increase Social
Security any more.
The IRAs, for example, were a big step
in the right direction. In the area of
corporate pension plans, however, there
is still a lot of legislative work to be done.
It should be easier and more attractive
for the smaller employer to provide a
pension plan for his employees, thus cutting down their reliance on Social
Security ERISA went a big step in the
wrong direction, and some of the
strictures in that act need to be removed.
Maybe we also need to provide direct
incentives to the employer to provide a
benefit for employees other than
owner-employees.
Robert Beck: Do you know what the
initials ERISA stand for? People who have
to deal with it all the time say it's "Every
Rotten Idea Since Adam." While it did
some good things, it also created a
cumbersome machinery that caused a lot
of small employer plans to go belly up.
The employer just decided to buy a
private pension plan of his own.
If you go back and take a look at
people who retired years ago, you'll see
that the private pension system started
small. It had been tax disadvantaged for a
long time. Study groups were fond of
saying that only 20 or 25 percent of the
people had private pension benefits. But
if you look forward, it's a different
picture. Our estimate is that 70 percent
of the people who have been working for
at least a year are under a private pension
program. So when you have that to
complement Social Security and personal
savings, a great deal can be done.
John Koskinen: How do you persuade
people that there really is a problem,
without undermining the credibility of
the system? You have a very well organized and increasingly mobile group of
current recipients and near-term recipi-

ents, and great political power exists
there. On the other hand, you have a lot
of workers who are 20 through 40 who
view themselves as never being recipients in the program. The fear is that you'll
end up with a tremendous generational
dispute, especially as the ratio of beneficiaries to workers increases.
Robert Beck: Russ, you started the
discussion by asking what the real problems with Social Security are. Two of the
most serious problems, I think, come not
in financing the system but in the public
perception of it. First, the public has
been led to believe the Social Security
beneficiaries just get back the money
they paid in. Actually, someone who paid
in the maximum from the very beginning
in 1937 and retired December 31,1981,
without a spouse benefit, would get
back all of the money he contributed to
the system in just 18 months. That's if he
paid the maximum tax every year since
1937. Someone who earned the average
income in that time and paid the corresponding tax would get all his money
back in 13 months, and if he had a spouse
benefit, in 11 months.
The second problem is that the system
lacks credibility. In a recent survey, 73
percent of the people between the ages
of 25 and 44 said there was little or no
chance that they would receive Social
Security benefits when they retired. I've
tested the percentage with audiences
around the country, and it's right on
target. Because of all the things they've
heard and read, people don't believe that
they will receive any benefits.
So I'm persuaded that in order to get at
the financial problems, we must also
address the need for public understanding and the need for credibility. Without
those two key elements, any chance of a
bipartisan approach to the financial
alternatives will go down the tubes.
John Flittie: If no real fix comes down
before long, isn't there going to be a tremendous temptation to dip into the
general treasury to finance the shortfall?

system through June 1983. Congress
intentionally put its feet to the fire,
knowing that it must take some action
before the middle of 1983 in order to
keep the benefits flowing. So while it's
true that if no action were taken, the
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance system
could not pay benefits on time for the
July 1983 checks, it's inconceivable that
Congress and the administration will
leave over 31.5 million people without
their benefit checks.
John Flittie: Isn't it possible, then, that for
the first time since Social Security was
established, Congress will do something
other than authorize interfund borrowing? Couldn't we have a major departure
in principle from the last 46 years?
Robert Myers: John, that's exactly right.
Some people want either to finance the
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund—that part
of the Medicare program—out of general
revenues, or to borrow from general
revenues. This would be a new development in the financing of the system. It
would take the system off its self-supporting basis.
Russell Palmer: Having discussed the
major problems facing the Social Security
system today and what you perceive as
the solutions to those problems, how do
we get the system back on a sound
footing? How realistic is it to expect that
in the near term we can make some of
these things happen?
John Koskinen: You can modify the
system in many different ways. You can
delay or reduce early retirement. You can
roll back full retirement. You can adjust
the amount of benefits. You can change
the taxes or start a trust fund. It's like an
organ. You can play it any way you like
and end up with whatever you need on
the bottom line. The question is, then,
what's the easiest change to get through?
Right now, we have the opportunity to
put the system on a sound footing with

Robert Myers: Legislation already
enacted does permit interfund borrowing, but no more than enough to take the
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relatively modest changes in any of these
areas. The great danger is that the
country will listen to those people who
say there really isn't a problem and that
we don't need to worry until the end of
the century. If we do nothing now, the
benefits will go on compounding for 17
more years; and, come the year 2000, we
won't have the luxury of wondering
whether to move retirement back a little
or cut benefit increases slightly.
Robert Baldwin: Right. We've got this
one chance. The government has to
come up with something that people will
look at, run their numbers by, and say
"Yes, we're going to have the federal
deficit in 1985 down to $50 billion or so.
It's credible." If we miss this chance,
you'll see the markets turn tail and run
the other way. Right now, we can do one
thing: change the indexing.
John Koskinen: I think it's an axiom that
the more possible solutions you have to a
problem, the less likely you are of putting
any of them into effect. We have a
consensus that something ought to be
done; let's not dissipate our energy on
quarrels over particular proposals. I know
we can't preprogram the effort, because
many different people are part of it. But
perhaps we could start by trying to figure
out what the minimum is that we need
to solve the problem. There may be a lot
of other things that ought to be done,
but if we can focus on the fewest
number of things that need to be done,
we have a much better chance of getting
them done.
Judge Rifkind: There are several institutions with channels into Capitol Hill that
are busy in this process. It seems to me
that instead of creating new ad hoc
government groups, now is the time to
shape the direction of those institutions
so that they will funnel in that minimum
message. If the Congress hears it from a
half-dozen different sources, it's bound
to be very persuasive.
John Koskinen: The pressure is strong
now to make something happen. We
have a deadline: if nothing is done before
mid-1983, the checks won't go out. This
crisis is our opportunity to put the system

on a sound footing for a long time to
come, but it also carries the risk of
rushing into a short-term solution—a
quick fix to beat the deadline—and
missing the opportunity to deal with the
long-term problems. A lot of people will
say, "Let's just get the immediate problem
out of the way, and we'll think about the
rest of it later." So I'd encourage everyone
concerned to seize this opportunity to
deal with the long-term problems while
we've got people focused on the
short-term crisis. Otherwise, fundamental change will take forever.
Robert Beck: Yes, the opportunity is very
real, and not only because of the coming
crisis. It's also because the subject has
been so well studied. We're not going to
be surprised by any new information or
proposals that we'll have to stop and
consider. Of course, there still are people
who say, "Scrap the whole damn thing.
Get people who are 45 or older an
annuity and have everybody from now
on start from scratch with an IRA." Most
people, though, agree that the system
has great value as the floor of protection.
Judge Rifkind: It's also very useful to the
economic system. Social Security is a
huge river of money flowing through and
irrigating this nation in the present
period of low productivity.
Robert Beck: My choice would be to
narrow the changes down to three
essentials: change the indexing system,
move toward mandatory participation in
Social Security, and gradually increase the
retirement age. With these three you
could put together a very sound program
that would enable the public to understand the system better, that would
restore the system's credibility, and that
would regain both short-term and
long-term financial viability.
There is pressure there to make
something happen. I think there are very
important and persuasive people on
both sides of the aisle who recognize
this. With pressure from the public to get
something done, and with congressional

Republicans and Democrats as well as
the administration willing to go on the
line together, we can move this. You
don't need 100 percent support. You
need only enough of a majority to take
away the political risks of coming down
on the side of sound solutions. It's really
not that difficult a problem if we address
it properly.
Robert Baldwin: People talk about
supply-side economics, but it's the
expense side that's eating us alive. If we
can just get expenses started down, then
we can work on the supply side. But if
we don't turn these entitlement programs around, we're dead.
Russell Palmer: I'd like to weave together
three thoughts that you've expressed.
First, the thought that we don't really
need to study this problem anymore.
We've got all kinds of workable solutions
here. Any one, two, or some combination will probably get the job done.
Second, there is the political pragmatics
of the problem, and the thought that we
very often come to a short-term solution
because that's the easiest one to swallow
in terms of the political sensitivity of the
issue. So while it would be very easy to
come to a short-term solution, the time
will never be better to come to some
meaningful long-term solutions, because
chances are if we put a short-term patch
on it, we will find that in 20 years it will
be even more difficult to make meaningful change, just as it would have been a
lot easier 20 years ago to fix the problem
we are now faced with. And then a third
thought that the judge and others
mentioned. In order to cause change, it's
going to have to be done through the
joint efforts of the administration and the
Democrats and Republicans in Congress
working together. What more responsible thing could they do than get together
on this issue?
Gentlemen, we appreciate your giving
us business'perspective on this issue.
It's certainly encouraging to find you
agreeing that the studies have been
done, the solutions are at hand, and the
opportunity is here. Thanks to your
persuasive knowledge of the problems
and your optimism that they can be
solved, I'd say the prospects of restoring
Social Security's credibility and its
long-term financial stability are hopeful,

indeed.
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